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Court disagreed, and stated that "we are 
satisfied that the consuming public 
understands that licenses ... are issued 
by governmental authorities and that a 
host of certificates ... are issued by pri-
vate organizations." ld. at 228Q. 
In balancing the State's interest in 
avoiding misleading consumers with the 
cost of completely banning advertise-
ments of certification, the Court found 
that less burdensome alternatives 
existed The State could create initial 
screening criteria for certifying organiza-
tions or require disclaimers on attorney 
advertisements about the organizations 
or their standards. ld. at 2292-93. 
It is interesting to note that Rule 2-
1 05( a)( 3) allows for attorneys to ad-
vertise specialties in patent or trademark 
law. The Court stated that a complete 
ban on advertising certifications by the 
state would be undermined by allowing 
such exceptions. ld. at 2291. 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice 
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist andJustice Scalia, argued that 
the State had a legitimate interest in 
regulating abuse in attorney advertising 
and that the public could be readily 
misled by the juxtaposition on the let-
terhead of petitioner's licensing and his 
NBTA certification. Therefore, consu-
mers could mistakenly conclude that 
Peel's services were of higher quality 
because of his certification and that the 
State had approved the certification. ld. 
at 2300 (O'Connor, j., dissenting). As 
such a misleading advertisement, the 
State had the authority to prevent Peel 
from advertising his certification. ld. at 
2301 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
In Peel v. Illinois, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld an attorney's 
right to advertise his certification under 
the first amendment commercial 
speech standards. States may regulate 
advertising certifications but may not 
ban their use altogether. Future adver-
tising by attorneys of their certifications 
might, therefore, be required to meet 
minimum state screening requirements 
or be forced to include restricting lan-
guage such as disclaimers. 
-JoanOcboa 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz: VIDEO-
TAPED EVIDENCE CAN BE 
ADMITTED AT THE CRIMINAL 
TRIALS OF DRUNK DRIVERS 
In the drunk driving case of Pennsyl-
vania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 ( 1990), 
the United States Supreme Court held 
that evidence obtained by way of video-
tape was admissible because the ques-
tions fell within the "routine booking" 
exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966). The Court also refused 
to suppress parts of the videotaped evi-
dence concerning statements made dur-
ing processing, since they were volun-
tary and not made during custodial 
interrogation. 
Inocencio Muniz was arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol 
and transported to a booking center 
after failing three standard field sobriety 
tests. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2642. In line 
with police procedure, the proceedings 
at the booking center were videotaped. 
The attending officer first asked Muniz 
the standard questions, including his 
name, address, height, weight, eye color, 
date of birth, and current age, to which 
Muniz stumbled over several responses. 
The officer then asked Muniz ifhe knew 
the date of his sixth birthday which 
Muniz was unable to provide. Finally, 
Muniz performed the three sobriety 
tests that he failed earlier and was 
requested to submit to a breathalyzer 
test, at which time he made several 
incriminating statements. ld. When 
Muniz refused to take the breath test, he 
was advised of his Miranda rights for the 
first time. The videotape of the proceed-
ings was admitted into evidence at his 
bench trial. Muniz was subsequently 
convicted of driving under the influence 
of alcohol. The Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania reversed his conviction, holding 
that once Muniz was arrested and taken 
into custody, all utterances and re-
sponses were clearly compelled by the 
questions presented him during the 
booking proceedings. Therefore, the 
Court concluded that his responses and 
communications were elicited before 
he received his Miranda warnings and 
should have been suppressed. ld. at 
2643. 
The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to decide whether various incrimi-
nating utterances of a drunk driving sus-
pect, made while performing a series of 
sobriety tests, constitute testimonial re-
sponses to custodial interrogation for 
purposes of the self-incrimination clause 
of the fifth amendment. ld. Eight justices 
agreed that most of the statements ad-
mitted into evidence did not violate the 
accused's fifth amendment rights, al-
though three reached this conclusion 
under a different analysis. 
The majority opinion began with a 
discussion of the types of evidence a 
suspect could not be compelled to pro-
duce. The Court noted that Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), held 
that the self-incrimination clause did 
not protect a suspect from being com-
pelled to produce "real or physical evi-
dence." Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2643. Yet 
the clause did protect an accused from 
being compelled to provide evidence of 
a testimonial or communicative nature. 
Id. 
Furthermore, since the utterances 
were made prior to Muniz's receiving 
his Miranda warnings, the Court also 
focused on the "informal compulsion 
exerted by the law enforcement officers 
during in-custody questioning." ld. at 
2644 ( quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
u.s. 436,461 (1966». Thus, the Court 
concluded that the case implicated both 
the "testimonial" and "compulsion" com-
ponents of the privilege against self-
incrimination in the context of pretrial 
questioning. ld. 
Next, the Court addressed Muniz's re-
sponses to the initial questions regard-
ing name, address, weight, eye color, 
date ()fbirth, and current age. Although 
MLJniz's responses were incriminating, 
to violate th~ self-incrimination clause, 
they must have been either testimonial 
or elicited by custodial interrogation. ld. 
"In order to be testimonial, an accused's 
communication must itself, explicitly or 
implicitly, relate a factual assertion or 
disclose information." ld. at 2646 ( quot-
ing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 
210 ( 1988) ). In comparison, the Court 
cited numerous types of evidence held 
not to be testimonial including finger-
printing, photographing, appearing in 
court, standing, walking, writing, speak-
ing, and being forced to provide a blood 
sample. Finally, the Court concluded 
that testimonial evidence encompasses 
all responses that, if asked of a sworn 
suspect during a criminal trial, would 
place the suspect in the cruel trilemma 
of self accusation, perjury, or contempt. 
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Id. at 2648. Thus, the statements were 
not testimonial. Id. at 2649. 
However, the Court concluded that 
when Muniz was asked whether he 
knew the date of his sixth birthday, he 
was confronted with the cruel trilemma 
in a coercive environment created by 
the custodial interrogation. Id. Since his 
answer was testimonial, it should have 
been suppressed. 
The Court then addressed the State's 
argument that the initial questioning 
period did not constitute custodial inter-
rogation or its "functional equivalent." 
Id. at 2650. In Rbode Island v. Innis, 446 
U.S. 291 (1980), the Supreme Court 
defined the "functional equivalent" of 
interrogation as "any words or actions 
on the part of the police (other than 
those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response from the suspect." 
Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650. Finding that 
custodial interrogation did exist, it none-
theless held Muniz's answers regarding 
name, address, weight, eye color, date of 
birth, and current age admissible as fall-
ing within the newly adopted "routine 
booking" exception, established in 
United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180 
(8th Cir. 1989), which exempts ques-
tions to secure the information neces-
sary to complete booking or pretrial 
services. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650. 
Muniz made additional statements 
while performing three sobriety tests 
and while deciding not to take a breath-
alyzer test. Yet, the Court noted, the 
statements were made in response to 
carefully scripted instructions not in-
tended to elicit any verbal responses. Id. 
at 2651. Therefore, the officer's words 
or actions did not constitute interroga-
tion and even the questions requesting a 
response were merely "attendant to" 
legitimate police procedure. Id. Hence, 
Muniz's statements were made voluntar-
ilyand thus were admissible. Id. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing a 
concurring opinion, agreed that the 
statements made when the accused was 
asked the date of his sixth birthday, 
should not have been suppressed. This 
result was premised on the grounds that 
if the police may require Muniz to use 
his body in order to demonstrate the 
level of his physical coordination, they 
should be able to require him to speak 
or write in order to determine mental 
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coordination.Id. at 2653 (Rehnquist, C. 
J., concurring). Rehnquist disagreed 
with the recognition of a routine book-
ing exception to Miranda. He felt the 
"booking" questions were not testi-
monial so there was no need to apply the 
privilege. Id. at 2654 (Rehnquist, C. )., 
concurring). 
Justice Marshall, the sole dissenter, 
agreed with the majority that Muniz's 
response to the question regarding the 
date of his sixth birthday should have 
been suppressed as the question consti-
tuted custodial interrogation prior to 
receipt of Miranda warnings. Id.(Mar-
shall,}., dissenting). He disagreed, how-
ever, with the recognition of the routine 
booking exception and believed the 
Court had misapplied the Innis test 
when considering custodial interroga-
tion.Id. at 2655-56 (Marshall,}., dissent-
ing). Marshall believed the routine 
booking exception would necessitate 
difficult, time consuming litigation over 
whether particular questions were rou-
tine, necessary for recordkeeping and 
designed to elicit incriminating testim-
ony. Id. at 2655 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). 
It is apparent that the Supreme Court 
will continue their conservative outlook 
with regard to drunk driving prosecu-
tions. As illustrated by this case, if evi-
dence is not obtained by way of custo-
dial interrogation or falls within the 
routine booking exception to Miranda, 
the courts will allow evidence obtained 
by way of videotape. 
- Freddie] Traub 
Wi/Iiams v. Wi/zack: MARYLAND 
STATUTE ALLOWING 
INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED 
ME NT ALLY ILL PATIENTS TO 
BE FORCIBLY MEDICATED 
VIOLATED PROCEDURAL 
DUE PROCESS 
In Williams v. Wilzack, 319 Md. 485, 
573 A.2d 809 (1990), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that § 10-708 
of the Maryland Health-General Article, 
which established procedures for medi-
cating mentally ill patients against their 
will, lacked the requisite procedural 
due process protections guaranteed by 
the state and federal constitutions. Al-
though the decision did not render the 
statute unconstitutional, it potentially 
did weaken the ability of psychiatrists to 
forcibly medicate possibly dangerous 
patients, even if such medication is 
approved by a clinical review panel. 
Laquinn Williams was committed to a 
state mental hospital after a judicial 
determination that he was not crimi-
nally responsible. See Md. Health-Gen. 
Code Ann. § 12-108 (1990). After Wil-
liams was diagnosed a paranoid schiz-
ophrenic, his doctor prescribed treat-
ment with an antipsychotic drug. Wil-
liams objected to taking the medication 
for fear it would disrupt his thought 
process, interfere with the exercise of 
his Sunni Muslim religion, and reduce 
his ability to assist his attorney in a sub-
sequent release hearing. Id. at 490,573 
A.2d at 811. A clinical review panel was 
convened to review William's decision. 
Williams and his lawyer were allowed to 
be present for part of the hearing so that 
Williams could explain his reasons for 
objecting. The panel, however, unani-
mously determined that the medication 
was the least intrusive way to effectively 
treat Williams and ordered that he be 
forcibly medicated. Id. at 490,573 A.2d 
at 811. Williams was medicated against 
his will for approximately two weeks 
until he stated his plans to obtain an 
injunction to prohibit the medication. 
The medication was, therefore, tempo-
rarily discontinued and another review 
panel was convened. This second review 
panel also unanimously recommended 
that Williams be forcibly medicated. Id. 
at 491,573 A.2d at 812. 
Williams filed an action in the Circuit 
Court for Montgomery County alleging 
that the procedures under § 10-708 vio-
lated his state and federal constitutional 
rights to privacy, due process, freedom 
of speech, thought, and religion. Id. The 
trial court determined that § 10-708 was 
both constitutional on its face and as 
applied. As such, the court granted the 
State's motion for summary judgment 
and denied William's motion for partial 
summary judgment. Williams appealed, 
and the court of appeals granted certio-
rari before the court of special appeals 
decided the case. Id. at 492, 573 A.2d at 
812. 
The court of appeals initially ex-
plained that without § 10-708, the com-
mon law rule as set forth in Sard v. 
Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 
( 1977) would apply. The Sard rule 
required that a physician obtain a pa-
tient's consent before he treated a pa-
tient in a non-emergency situation. Wil-
